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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this note is to analyse a recent judgment of the South
Gauteng High Court in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers (Pty) Ltd v
Trustee of the Capital Property Trust Collective Investment Scheme in Property
(unreported GSJ judgment, case no 41882/12, 10 December 2013).
Although this is a fairly short judgment it raises important questions regarding
the law pertaining to encroachments. As such, it warrants a discussion of the
ambit of the courts’ discretion where encroachments are concerned.
The facts of the case can be summarised as follows. The applicant and
respondent owned neighbouring commercial properties. The applicant
owned plot 989, which measures 5989 square metres, while the respondent
owned plot 990, which measures roughly 1821 hectares. The applicant had
initially owned both properties and sold off plot 990 to the respondent on 31
July 2006. At the time that the transfer took place, both parties were unaware
that the existing fence between the two plots was not situated on the cadastral
boundary between the properties (para 4). The inaccurate placing of the
fence resulted in a triangular piece of land (measuring some 2271 square
metres), an incomplete building (approximately 703 square metres in size)
and a guard house structure being incorrectly incorporated as part of the
applicant’s land, although they actually belonged to the respondent (para 2).
When the applicant became aware of the encroachment, it approached the
respondent to acquire the encroachment area. The applicant offered to pay
an amount of R4 410 721.00 plus a solatium of R100 000 for the encroach-
ment to remain in place in perpetuity. However, the negotiations failed and
the parties approached the Gauteng South High Court for a decision on the
matter.
Victor J succinctly set out the three main issues to be decided in the ﬁrst
paragraph of the judgment:
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‘The issues for determination is [sic] whether in the absence of a claim for
demolition by an owner an encroacher can insist on transfer, alternatively a
right in perpetuity in respect of the encroachment. A further issue is whether
the applicant’s claim for the relief has prescribed and whether the disputes of
fact justify the dismissal of the applicant[’s] claim.’
The ﬁrst part of the judgment (paras 6–12) deals with whether the applicant
(as the encroacher) can claim transfer of the encroached-upon land in the
absence of a claim by the respondent (the affected landowner) for removal of
the encroachment (para 6). Regarding the question whether an encroacher
can insist on transfer of the encroached-upon land in the absence of a claim
for demolition by an owner, Victor J held that ‘the applicant’s cause of action
[based on a claim for transfer and compensation] is good in law and can be
raised in the absence of a demolition order’ (para 12). However, the court
cautioned immediately that each case will depend on its own facts, and it is
these particular facts that would determine whether such an order would be
appropriate (ibid).
In the second part of the judgment the court discussed the respondent’s
defence based on prescription (paras 13–17). The respondent argued that the
applicant knew that it was in the wrong more than three years prior to the
application (para 4) and therefore the wrong was a debt which had prescribed
in terms of s 11(d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (para 13). In contrast to
this view, the court held that an encroachment cannot be frozen in a point in
time: it is a continuing wrong being committed against another (paras
15–16). Consequently, because the respondent (as the affected landowner)
always has the right to demand the removal of the encroachment, prescrip-
tion was held not to be applicable in this context (paras 15 and 17).
In the end, the court held that it was unwilling to order transfer of the
entire triangular encroachment in terms of its discretion (in other words, the
whole area affected by the incorrect placing of the fence between the plots)
(para 38). The court was only willing to order that the incomplete building
structure be transferred to the applicant. It should be noted that the applicant
was not willing to accept the transfer of the incomplete building by itself, and
as a consequence the court dismissed the entire application (para 39).
Two aspects relating to the ambit of the court’s discretion are signiﬁcant.
The ﬁrst is the court’s assumption that the discretion to deny the removal of
the encroachment includes the power to order the transfer of the
encroached-upon land. This decision seems to provide authority for the
proposition that an encroacher can bring an independent cause of action
claiming transfer of the encroachment area. This means that an encroacher
would not have to wait for the affected owner to seek demolition ﬁrst, but is
in law permitted to approach a court directly, seeking transfer of his
neighbour’s property against the payment of compensation. It is not clear
that adequate authority exists for such a conclusion. In the next part of this
note, some of the older South African cases will be revisited in order to
analyse whether the decision provides an accurate reﬂection of the law.
The second issue worthy of investigation relates to the distinction between
an illegal structure and an encroachment. If we are to assume that the
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discretion that courts have in the context of encroachments includes the
power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land — and that the
encroacher is able to bring an independent cause of action seeking such
transfer, as Victor J found — a related question may arise in some instances.
Are we also to assume that the court has the power to exercise its discretion in
this regard when the encroachment is also an illegal structure erected without
the necessary building permission?
In this note these two issues will be investigated with reference to the
judgment in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers. My preliminary hypothesis
is that the conclusions reached by Victor J were reached too easily and
without an appropriately in-depth analysis.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON TRANSFER OF THE
ENCROACHED-UPON LAND
The decision in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers creates the impression
that an encroacher can bring an independent cause of action claiming the
transfer of the portion of his neighbour’s land which has been encroached
upon. In addition, Victor J assumed that the discretion of the court in the
context of encroachments includes the power to order a transfer of the
encroachment area. Were these assumptions correct? It is necessary to discuss
brieﬂy the discretion that courts have in the context of encroachments. The
aim of this discussion is to answer the question whether courts indeed do
have the power to order the transfer of the encroached-upon land, and to
assess whether that means that encroachers are entitled to seek transfer
without an affected landowner ﬁrst claiming the removal of the encroach-
ment.
In South African law, the affected landowner usually demands that the
encroaching structure be removed in the case where a building is partially
erected on the land of another. Therefore, removal is ordinarily explained as
being the default remedy in the case of encroachments (see C G van der
Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202; P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar & H Mostert
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 121; J R L Milton
‘The law of neighbours in SA’ 1969 Acta Juridica 223 at 237; C G van der
Merwe & J B Cilliers ‘The ‘‘year and a day rule’’ in South African law: Do
our courts have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case
of structural encroachments on neighbouring land?’ (1994) 57 THRHR 587
at 588. See further Pike v Hamilton (1853–1856) 2 Searle 191 at 196, 198,
200; Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360 at 361; Stark v Broomberg 1904 CTR
135 at 137).
It is clear from Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O)
(‘Rand Waterraad’) and Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA
281 (C) (‘Brian Lackey Trust’) that courts have the discretion to award
compensation instead of removal of encroaching structures. This was
conﬁrmed in Phillips v South African National Parks Board [2010] ZAECGHC
27. Furthermore, in recent times courts dealing with encroachment disputes
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have tended to prefer to use their discretion to award compensation rather
than to order removal, more readily exercising this discretion in favour of the
encroacher where policy considerations dictate such an outcome (for a
discussion of the discretion of the court in this regard, see Rand Waterraad
(supra); Brian Lackey Trust (supra); Milton op cit at 234; Van der Merwe &
Cilliers op cit at 588; S Scott ‘Recent developments in case law regarding
neighbour law and its inﬂuence on the concept of ownership’ (2005) 16
Stellenbosch LR 351; Anne Pope ‘Encroachment or accession? The impor-
tance of the extent of encroachment in light of South African constitutional
principles’ (2007) 124 SALJ 537; A J van der Walt ‘Replacing property rules
with liability rules: Encroachment by building’ (2008) 125 SALJ 592; Z
Temmers Building Encroachments and Compulsory Transfer of Ownership
(unpublished LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University, 2010) 50–7). It is
also trite law that the discretion is wide and equitable and dependent on the
circumstances in the speciﬁc case (see Rand Waterraad (supra) at 139).
Furthermore, it seems as though courts would be more willing to order that
the encroachment remains intact in instances where the continued existence
of the encroachment results in an insigniﬁcant impact on the affected
landowner’s property rights (see Temmers op cit at 143–5). This would
usually involve a case where there is an encroachment of a foundation of a
wall or a really insigniﬁcant building encroachment that extends only a few
inches into the property of a neighbour, without any perceptible effect on his
use and enjoyment of the property. However, in the case of more signiﬁcant
encroachments, these types of encroachments usually result in a substantial
limitation on the rights of the affected landowner. Therefore, the continued
existence of the encroachment results in such an intrusion into the property
rights of the affected landowner that simply cannot be justiﬁed on some
instances (see Phillips v South African National Parks Board (supra) para 21 and
Temmers op cit at 144). Consequently, it is more likely that courts will order
demolition of the structure where it has a signiﬁcant impact on the affected
landowners’ rights (however, see Rand Waterraad (supra) and Brian Lackey
Trust (supra), which show that there are cases in which even large encroach-
ments were left intact: but it must be pointed out that there were other
factors indicating that demolition would not be the appropriate remedy in
the circumstances). It was conﬁrmed in Brian Lackey Trust that the discretion
is not limited to minor encroachments but that it may even be exercised in
the case of signiﬁcant ones (Brian Lackey Trust (supra) para 29). Interestingly,
the court in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers was prepared to transfer the
incomplete building which amounted to a signiﬁcant encroachment, and
accordingly the rationale appears to be similar to that of Brian Lackey Trust in
so far as it indicates that courts are not loathe to allow large encroachments to
remain in place.
Regarding the court’s discretion in the case of encroachment, it was
highlighted in Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D) that the discretion to
substitute removal with compensation is one which is separate from the
power to order the transfer of the encroached-upon land. In Meyer v Keiser
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the plaintiff instituted action against the defendant for the removal of an
encroachment. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had built a house on
the adjoining property without his knowledge, which encroached upon the
property of the plaintiff to a substantial extent. The defendant in turn argued
that it would be unjust and inequitable to order removal of the encroach-
ment (see Meyer v Keiser (supra) at 505). Moreover, he asserted that the court
should order the transfer of the plaintiff’s land to him in exchange for
compensation. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the plea
submitted by him ‘disclosed a valid ‘‘defence’’ in the sense that the reparation
tendered could be ordered’ (ibid at 506). Although reliance was placed on
Christie v Haarhoff & others (1886–1887) 4 HCG 349 for the assertion that an
order for transfer may be made, the court in Meyer v Keiser pointed out that
the basis of the judgment in Christie v Haarhoff was an award for damages in
lieu of a removal order (see Meyer v Keiser (supra) at 506).
The decision in Christie v Haarhoff (supra) is typically cited — and was in
fact so used in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers — to substantiate the fact
that a court has the discretion to order transfer of the encroached-upon land
to the encroacher. However, it should be noted that the plaintiff in Christie v
Haarhoff was in principle willing to accept compensation instead of removal,
and the inevitable loss of property that would accompany the continued
existence of the encroachment. Therefore, the court in Christie v Haarhoff
(supra) at 354 (emphasis supplied) pointed out that
‘[because the plaintiff] properly does not press his strict rights [to removal of the
encroachment] to the extreme point; and it is practically agreed that the proper
course will be for the plaintiff to transfer to the defendants the ground built
upon, upon their paying all expenses of and incidental to the transfer, together
with reasonable compensation for depriving him of the ground’.
Therefore, the plaintiff in Christie v Haarhoff was open to the transfer in
exchange for compensation, and this was a signiﬁcant factor in the framing of
the court’s order. Similarly, it can be argued in Van Boom v Visser (supra):
another case relied upon by the defendant in Meyer v Keiser (supra) that the
plaintiff also did not press his rights strictly, but was willing to accept 100
pounds to tolerate the encroachment in perpetuity and to accept transfer of
the encroached-upon land. With reference to the question whether a court
has the discretion to order transfer, Kumleben J in Meyer v Keiser (supra) at
507 remarked:
‘When an award of damages is acknowledged as the permissible and appropriate
form of relief in the case of an encroachment, an order for the transfer of that
portion of the property encroached upon is incidental to, and consequent
upon, such an award. The virtue of such an ancillary order is obvious but it
need not necessarily be made (cf De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217 at 233), and
in certain circumstances to do so may be impracticable or not permissible in
law. The important point is that, whatever form the order takes in such a case, it
is the award of damages which is the true basis for the relief granted. In my
view, perhaps as a result of the form of the orders in the two decisions relied
upon, this was overlooked by the pleader in the instant case which resulted in a
misconception of the nature and extent of the Court’s discretionary authority.’
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On the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that the question of the ambit
of the court’s discretion in the context of encroachments has proven to be a
particularly challenging aspect of this area of law. In this regard, I have
highlighted how important it is to distinguish between the court’s discretion
to replace removal with compensation, on the one hand, and the power to
order transfer of the encroached-upon land, on the other hand, because
different levels of scrutiny are required in order to justify the limitation
on the affected landowner’s property rights in each respective case (See
Z T Boggenpoel ‘Compulsory transfer of ownership: A constitutional
analysis’ (2013) 76 THRHR 313). More speciﬁcally, I argue that whereas the
discretion does exist with regard to the decision to replace removal with
compensation, a similar discretion does not evidently exist with regard to the
power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land.
In light of Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers, it can be argued that a
further distinction needs to be drawn. In the earlier encroachment cases the
question was speciﬁcally whether the court’s discretion to replace removal
with compensation included the power to order transfer of the encroached-
upon land. In my view, Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers raises a different
(but related) question considering the ambit of the court’s discretion in the
case of encroachments. The primary question that dominated the judgment
in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers was whether an encroacher can bring
an independent cause of action claiming transfer of the encroached-upon
land.
If this question is answered in the afﬁrmative — which it was in this case
— then we have to assume that the discretion of the court in encroachment
cases includes the power to order transfer of the encroached upon land,
because if the encroacher is permitted to bring a cause of action seeking
transfer of the encroaching area against compensation, the court is only
required to determine whether or not transfer should be ordered. However,
these assumptions are problematic.
For a start, the encroachment cases that were used to come to this
conclusion certainly do not provide the necessary authority to conclude that
an encroaching landowner can claim — in terms of an independent cause of
action — that his neighbour’s land should be transferred to him in terms of
the court’s discretion in this context. At the most, the cases provide authority
for the fact that the court does have a discretion to replace removal with
compensation, and in some limited instances, transfer may be ordered,
provided that both parties are amenable to the reallocation of these property
rights.
The court in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers stated that ‘[i]n Christie v
Haarhoff and Others (1886–1887) 4 HCG 349 although there is an absence of
reasoning the court granted transfer of the encroached area and ordered
compensation’ (para 9). However, it was clear in Christie v Haarhoff (supra)
that the plaintiff (the affected landowner) instituted the cause of action on the
basis of removal of the building erected by the defendants (ibid at 352).
Therefore, the question whether an encroacher can bring a cause of action
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on the basis of transfer of the encroached-upon land was not considered in
Christie v Haarhoff. With regard to the end result — namely that transfer was
ordered — it was mentioned earlier that the plaintiff in Christie v Haarhoff was
willing to accept transfer in exchange for compensation. Therefore, it cannot
be contended seriously that the court can arrogate to itself the power to order
the transfer of the affected land against the will of the affected landowner.
What is even less appropriate is to suggest that Christie v Haarhoff provides
authority for the proposition that an encroacher can bring a claim for transfer
of the affected landowner’s property in the absence of a claim for demolition
of the encroachment by the affected landowner.
The court in Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers also relied on Brian
Lackey Trust (supra) and Rand Waterraad (supra) to reason that ‘this court has a
discretion to order transfer and compensation’ and therefore that the
‘applicant’s cause of action is good in law and can be raised in the absence of a
demolition order’ (para 12 of the Fedgroup judgment). Once again, neither
Brian Lackey Trust nor Rand Waterrraad provides authority for the view that
the court’s discretion includes the power to order transfer of the encroached-
upon land, or that the applicant (as the encroacher) can seek an independent
claim for transfer of the respondent’s land. What these decisions do illustrate
is that the discretion does exist in the context of encroachments. Further,
they also indicate in which speciﬁc circumstances a court is likely to exercise
the discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment in place.
It is interesting to note that Brian Lackey Trust may have been relevant in so
far as the plaintiff was the encroaching neighbour who sought an order
‘declaring the defendant to be disentitled to the removal from erf 878 of the
encroachment erected thereon by the plaintiff; subject to the payment of
damages’ (Brian Lackey Trust (supra) para 9). However, it should be stressed
that the question in Brian Lackey Trust was whether removal of the structure
should be ordered or whether the encroachment should remain in place in
exchange for compensation (ibid para 1). Although, the court did mention
that in the process of denying the defendant his right to removal of the
encroachment, it may have resulted in the fact that the plaintiff would have
‘effectively acquire[d] the defendant’s land’ (see Fedgroup Participation Bond
Managers para 10; also Brian Lackey Trust (supra) para 16). However, it is
doubtful whether this statement necessarily means that one would be able to
assume that an encroacher can (in the light of Brian Lackey Trust) approach
the court directly and seek transfer of the encroached-upon land. The sources
therefore fail to substantiate the conclusions reached by Victor J in Fedgroup
Participation Bond Managers about an encroacher being permitted to bring a
cause of action seeking the transfer of the encroaching area in return for
compensation.
AN ILLEGAL STRUCTURE OR AN ENCROACHMENT?
A second question that becomes relevant in the light of the Fedgroup
Participation Bond Managers case is the ambit of the court’s discretion when the
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encroachment also happens to be an illegal structure in terms of of the
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. The
respondent had argued that ‘the structure is illegal and the local authority
would in any event order the demolition of the incomplete building’ (see
para 26).
Some interesting remarks were made by Koen J on this speciﬁc point in a
judgment of the KwaZulu-Natal High Court in Dyecomber (Pty) Ltd & another
v East Coast Papers CC [2013] ZAKZPHC 61, speciﬁcally with regard to the
distinction between an illegal structure and an encroachment. The court
stated that it did not have the discretion to decide whether or not a building
structure which has no building plans, should be demolished (para 20).
Therefore, in principle there is no discretion — as there is in terms of the
common law rules regulating encroachment — to allow the encroachment
to remain intact if the encroachment is also an illegal building (ibid).
It is worthwhile to mention brieﬂy the facts that gave rise to this
conclusion to draw an analogy with the Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers
case. In Dyecomber, lot 1188 and lot 1189 were neighbouring properties. The
second appellant occupied lot 1188 from 1998 and its managing director
caused a second level to be added and a roof to be built on the existing
building on its property. These extensions resulted in the structure, which
protruded from lot 1188 onto lot 1189, causing an encroachment onto the
respondent’s property. The ﬁrst appellant then took transfer of lot 1188 (para
6). No plans were obtained for the erection of the second level that was
added to the appellants’ home, or for the roof that was also built on lot 1188
(para 12). Consequently, the encroaching structures constituted an illegal
structure in terms of s 4 of the National Building Regulations and Building
Standards Act. According to s 4(1) of that Act:
‘No person shall without the prior approval in writing of the local authority in
question, erect any building in respect of which plans and speciﬁcations are to
be drawn and submitted in terms of thisAct.’
According to a ﬁre safety ofﬁcer of the eThekwini Municipality, ‘if plans for
the building alterations in respect of the building on erf 1188, part of which
constitutes the encroachment on erf 1189, had been submitted, they would
not have been approved by the municipality’ (para 10). The ﬁre safety ofﬁcer
also highlighted the violation of the building line restrictions — speciﬁcally
in terms of the prescriptions applicable with regard to the allowable distance
between buildings (paras 11 and 13). The court in Dyecomber (supra) relied on
Lester v Ndlambe Municipality & another [2014] 1 All SA 402 (SCA), in which
the SCA held that a court — in terms of s 4 of the National Building
Regulations and Building Standards Act — does not have the discretion to
decide whether or not a building structure, which has no building plans,
should be demolished (para 20).
As a result of these precedents, it is clear that there is no discretion — as
there is in terms of the common law regulating encroachment — to allow the
encroachment to remain intact (para 20). The court in Dyecomber explained
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that although the Lester decision could be distinguished from the facts in
Dyecomber, s 21 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards
Act should in principle be applicable to municipalities and other personae
(para 23). On this basis, the court held that the ratio decidendi of Lester is
applicable to a municipality or to a neighbour.
The court in Dyecomber stated that where an encroachment also resulted in
an illegal structure, the only legal remedy was the demolition of the
encroachment (paras 18 and 19). The court also reiterated that it has no
discretion to leave in place an illegal structure that happened to be an
encroachment as well (para 22).
For purposes of the dialogue concerning Fedgroup Participation Bond
Managers, it is important to take note of the court in Dyecomber’s distinction
between neighbour law (encroachment) cases and public law (principle of
legality) cases (see para 12 and 19 of the Dyecomber judgment). The court
drew a clear distinction between cases where there are no approved plans for
the building works (in other words illegal buildings as contemplated by the
National Building Regulations and Building StandardsAct) and the so-called
‘normal’ encroachment cases where the assumption is that there are building
plans that were in principle approved, but for some reason an encroachment
had nonetheless occurred. In the latter instances, courts generally have the
discretion on the basis of fairness and equity to decide whether an encroach-
ing structure should be removed or remain in place (against the payment of
compensation) (see Rand Waterraad (supra) at 138; Brian Lackey Trust (supra);
Phillips v South African National Parks Board (supra); Roseveare v Katmer, Katmer
v Roseveare [2013] ZAGPJHC 18; see also Temmers op cit ch 3; Z T
Boggenpoel ‘The discretion of courts in encroachment disputes’ (2012) 23
Stellenbosch LR 253). However, in instances where no approval was acquired,
there is authority for the fact that it is not within the court’s discretion to
determine whether illegal building works should remain intact (see Lester v
Ndlambe Municipality (supra)). As a result, the two instances are distinguish-
able because the extent of the courts’ discretion in the respective cases differs.
The above-mentioned distinction may be relevant with regard to the
partially-completed structure erected on the respondent’s land without the
necessary approval from local authority in Fedgroup Participation Bond Manag-
ers (see para 26). It is questionable whether the use of common-law remedies
(speciﬁcally the removal of the encroaching structures, compensation, or
even transfer, as indicated in Fedgroup) should be permitted when there is
legislation (with very speciﬁc remedies) to regulate a speciﬁc point of law (see
A J van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 35. See also A J van der Walt
‘Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reﬂections on the 2007 term’ (2008) 1
Constitutional Court Review 77; Karl E Klare ‘Legal subsidiarity & Constitu-
tional rights: A reply to AJ van der Walt’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review
129 at 134). According to Van der Walt’s subsidiarity principles, parties
should not be free to rely on the common law to bring their cause of action
when legislation has speciﬁcally been enacted to regulate the ﬁeld (see Van
der Walt 2008 Constitutional Court Review op cit at 100–3 and Property and
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Constitution op cit at 35–9. This principle was established as a result of the
Constitutional Court decisions of South African National Defence Union v
Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA400 (CC) paras 51–2 and Minister of Health NO
v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign & another as
Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 437). The way in which the
arguments in Dyecomber are structured illustrates clearly the application of the
subsidiarity principles, and establishes an important precedent for cases where
encroachments also happen to be illegal structures. Fedgroup Participation Bond
Managers should really have been decided on the basis of remedies provided
in the National Building Regulations and Building StandardsAct, and not on
common-law remedies available within the context of encroachment law. In
this respect, then, it seems sensible that the question of the ambit of the
discretion of the court should be limited to instances where the encroach-
ment results despite approval of building plans. By contrast, it is probably
advisable to decide illegal building cases in terms of the National Building
Regulations and Building StandardsAct.
CONCLUSION
In this short note, the outcome of Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers has
been scrutinised with reference to two aspects. Fedgroup Participation Bond
Managers seems to provide authority for the fact that the court’s discretion in
the context of building encroachments includes the power to order transfer
of the encroaching structure, and also that an encroacher can bring an
independent cause of action claiming transfer of the encroachment. There-
fore, the decision is a novel one. However, it is questionable whether the
court’s assumptions can be substantiated with valid authority. As to the ﬁrst, I
have argued that the older South African cases do not provide adequate
authority for such a conclusion and Fedgroup Participation Bond Managers failed
to provide an accurate view of the law as far as the discretion of courts in the
context of encroachments are concerned. None of the cases relied upon by
the court provides authority for the fact that an encroacher can approach a
court seeking transfer of the encroached-upon land.
With regard to the second assumption, it was necessary to determine
whether an encroacher can ask a court to exercise its discretion in terms of
the common-law rules regulating encroachment, when the encroachment is
at the same time an illegal structure erected without the necessary building
permission in terms of s 4 of the National Building Regulations and Building
Standards Act. I concluded that in instances where no approval was acquired,
there is authority for the fact that it is not within the court’s discretion to
determine whether illegal building works should remain intact. Therefore, a
distinction needs to be drawn between cases where illegal structures occur
and there are no approved plans for the building works (in terms of the
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act), and encroach-
ment cases where there are approved building plans, but where the
encroachment nonetheless occurred. This distinction is necessary, in my
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view, to ensure that in instances where legislation does exist, private law
remedies are not used to by-pass compliance with that legislation.
One can only hope that if this decision goes on appeal, the appeal court
will provide greater clarity concerning these two aspects, which are not
self-evident from the discussion in the court a quo or the conclusions that
were drawn in the judgment. Clarity in this regard will go a long way in
ensuring that Professor Milton’s remarks that ‘[t]his portion of the law is in a
very unsatisfactory state’ (Milton op cit 234) will not remain as true now as
they were when they were made 46 years ago.
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